Introduction
The extent to which oil price shocks are passed through to domestic inflation has a long tradition in macroeconomics (see, e.g., Barsky and Kilian 2002 , Hooker 2002 , van den Noord and Andre 2007 , Chen 2009 , Kilian and Lewis 2011 . As discussed in Kilian (2014) , from a theoretical point of view, the effect of exogenous oil price shocks on consumer prices is ambiguous. On the one hand, oil price shocks may raise the price level, to the extent that they reduce the domestic supply of real output. On the other hand, they may lower the price level to the extent that they depress domestic demand.
This paper provides disaggregate evidence on the effect of oil price shocks on the components of the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), complementing existing evidence on the pass-through at the aggregate level. The importance of studying the effects of oil price shocks using disaggregate data has been illustrated in number of related contexts including stock returns (Kilian and Park, 2009 ), consumer expenditures (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009) , and industrial production (Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada, 2011) .
In what follows, we report very strong and statistically significant inflationary effects only in the expenditure categories of highly energy-intensive commodities, while very limited degree of pass-through to goods and services are found from less energy-intensive expenditures.
We interpret these findings as follows. When the oil price shock occurs, consumers may experience a decrease in real consumption expenditures for nonenergy-related goods and services, if the demand for energy-related goods and services is inelastic (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009 ). This may shift the demand for less energy-intensive goods and services more than those of highly energy-intensive expenditures, resulting in heterogeneous responses to the oil price shock.
The rest of our manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a data description and the empirical model to study the degree of pass-through to U.S.
CPIs. In Section 3, we provide our main findings using highly disaggregated CPI components as well as aggregate level indices. Section 4 concludes. To measure the dynamic effects of an oil price shock on each CPI component, we employ structural impulse response analysis. We postulate a recursively identified bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the change in the real spot oil price (∆ ) and the j th component of CPI inflation ( ).
1 We follow Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson (2013) in restricting the sample to start in 1974 in recognition of the structural change taking place in late 1973 in the relationship between oil prices and the U.S. economy. 2 We don't report empirical results for Recreation, and Education and Communication due to lack of observations. 3 Detailed information is available upon request.
Where is the intercept, denotes the slope parameter matrices, is a vector of independent white noise processes, and ∆ , ′ . We use six lags to be consistent with Edelstein and Kilian (2009) . 4 The identifying assumption is that the real price of oil is predetermined with respect to the U.S. CPI (see Kilian and Vega 2011) . 95% percentile confidence bands are constructed based on the recursive design wild bootstrap of Goncalves and Kilian (2004) .
Estimated Effects of the Oil Price Shock
We first report impulse-response function estimates for 7 CPI sub-indices as well as the total (all items) CPI to a 1% oil price shock in Figure 1 . We find qualitatively different responses across indices to the positive oil price shock. That is, we observe a statistically significant positive response of the total CPI and the Energy, the Housing, and the Transportation CPI sub-indices, while very weak evidence of pass-through was found from the rest of other CPI sub-indices.
Based on point estimates, the Energy CPI increases by about 0.4% in 6 months then stabilizes in about 1 year with a 0.34% permanent increase. The
Transportation CPI exhibits an about 0.16% permanent increase. The Housing CPI increases by about 0.05% in two years. The total CPI responds weaker than these sub-indices, increasing by about 0.07% in two years, but its responses are statistically significant at the 5% level. Responses of Other sub-indices are not only negligibly small but also insignificant.
It should be noted that the response function estimates for the Energy CPI are quite strong and significant at the 5% level, whereas the CPI sub-index of All In a nutshell, we found that the statistically significant, though quantitatively small, degree of pass-through from the oil price shock to the overall CPI might have been driven by substantial increases in prices of energy-intensive goods and services. In what follows, we extend our investigation of the effects of oil price shocks to highly disaggregated CPI components to study how the oil price shock may affect the consumers through heterogeneous responses of CPI subindices. negligible and insignificant responses. The Alcoholic Beverage CPI is an exception as it responds significantly at the 5% level after 7 months since the impact. However, the degree of pass-through is very small, around 0.03%.
We also report the FEVDC analysis for these category prices in Table 2 . The results are consistent with the IRF evidence as we find very small contributions of the oil price shock in explaining variations of these inflation expectations even in the long-run.
Figure 2 and Table 2 around here
We note that the Housing CPI exhibits statistically significant and positive, but small responses that reaches about 0.05% in two years (see Figure 3 ). However, some The FEVDC analysis is reported in Table 4 . For the Transportation, Gasoline, and the Private Transportation CPIs, the oil price shock explains over 40%, while it explains less than 10% for the rest CPI inflation rates in this category. Table 4 around here 6 All results are available upon requests.
Figure 4 and
We find statistically significant evidence of pass-through only from 2 major expenditure categories, the Transportation and Housing CPIs. We also note that significant responses are often quantitatively small with exceptions of highly energyrelated components CPIs such as the Gasoline and the Fuel Oil CPIs. These findings imply that observed significant degree of pass-through to the (total) All Items CPI might be driven by a few energy-related expenditures, even though their influence as to the quantitative measure may be weak. Does this mean that the oil price shock may not matter to consumers because it shows insignificant degree of pass-through in majority expenditure categories?
We do not think so. When the oil price shock occurs, consumers experience a decrease in real income for non-energy expenditures if the demand for energy is inelastic.
As decreases in real spending for non-energy expenditures shift the demand curve to the left, prices in those expenditure categories will increase less than those of energyintensive expenditures, because both the supply and the demand curve shift back in those markets. Our findings are consistent with this interpretation.
We also investigate the effect of the oil price shock on expenditures for Commodities, Nondurables, Services, Durables, and All Items Less Food/Medical Care.
As shown in Figure 5 , we observed significant pass-through to all of these CPIs.
Compared with the Commodities and the Nondurable CPIs, evidence of pass-through to the Service and Durables CPI is relatively less significant both quantitatively and qualitatively. Interestingly, we find significant effects of the oil price shock on component
CPIs when Food and Medical Care expenditures are excluded, which is consistent with our findings because those components responded to the oil price shock insignificantly.
The FEVDC analysis reported in Table 5 is again consistent with the IRFs since we find the oil price shock explains about 40% of innovations in the Commodities and the Nondurables inflation, while it explains a lot less in the Service and the Durables inflation. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper empirically evaluates the degree of pass-through from the oil price shock to disaggregated component CPIs in the US. We find very limited effects of the oil price shock on majority CPIs including the Food and Beverage, the Apparel, the Housing, and the Medical Care CPIs, while more energy-intensive expenditures such as the Energy and Transportation CPIs show statistically significant evidence pass-through. Therefore, a significant response of the total CPI to the oil price shock seems to be mainly driven by substantial increases in the prices of energy-related expenditures. However, we also note that the response of the total CPI is quantitatively small, though highly significant at the 5%, reflecting relatively small shares of those energy-related expenditure CPIs in the determination of the total CPI.
These heterogeneous responses may not be explained if one views the oil price shock as primarily the supply shock, because a negative shift of the supply curve will result in increases in the equilibrium price. We attempt to solve this puzzle using the spending adjustment effect based on the work of Edelstein and Kilian (2009), who propose the possibility of a negative income effect caused by unexpected changes in the oil price. When the oil price increases unexpectedly, consumers will face substantial decreases in their expenditures of non-energy related commodities if the demand for energy is inelastic. Put it differently, they must reduce consumption for non-energy commodities since they are not able to adjust the budget for energy products.
Decreases in the demand for those non-energy commodities then increase the price a lot less compared with more energy-intensive goods and services, because not only the supply but also the demand curve shift to the left, resulting in weak and limited passthrough from the oil price shock to those CPI sub-indices. That is, even though the oil price shock has limited effects, quantitatively and qualitatively, on majority expenditures, its influence on consumers may not be negligible because overall consumption is likely to fall, which may provide useful information from the perspective of policymakers.
Figure 1. Consumer Price Index Responses to a 1% Oil Price Shock
Note: Accumulated response functions are obtained from a bivariate vector autoregressive model with the real oil price inflation ordered first. The 95% confidence bands (dashed lines) are obtained from 2,000 recursive design wild bootstrap draws (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) .
Figure 2. Food and Beverage Price Responses to a 1% Oil Price Shock
Note: Accumulated response functions are obtained from a bivariate vector autoregressive model with the real oil price inflation ordered first. The 95% confidence bands (dashed lines) are obtained from 2,000 recursive design wild bootstrap draws (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) . recursive design wild bootstrap draws (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) . (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) . (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004) . 
